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Extradition as a Tool
for International Cooperation:
Lessons from the U.S.-Mexico Relationship
EMILY EDMONDS-POLI AND DAVID A. SHIRK†

I. INTRODUCTION
Whereas globalization offers limitless opportunities for criminal
actors to engage in illicit activities, law enforcement agencies typically
operate within strictly delimited national boundaries and jurisdictions.1
Thus, in the era of trans-nationalism, cooperation through the use of
international extradition offers a potentially promising tool for
countries seeking to extend the long arm of the law beyond borders.
The subject has been well studied by historians and legal experts, who
have written insightfully on the historical and technical aspects of
extradition.2 However, there is considerably less analysis of many of
the practical and political considerations involved in extradition, and
very few studies that explicitly examine the power relationships,
strategic dynamics, and political considerations related to extradition.3
© 2018 Emily Edmonds-Poli and David A. Shirk
† Dr. Emily Edmonds-Poli is department chair and associate professor in the Department
of Political Science and International Relations at the University of San Diego. David Shirk is
professor and graduate director in the same department. An earlier draft of this paper was
presented at the 2017 Latin American Studies Association meeting in Lima, Peru, and
significantly revised for presentation at the Fall 2017 Symposium on The U.S. Mexico
Relationship in International Law and Politics hosted at the University of Maryland Carey
School of Law on Friday, October 20, 2017. The authors are grateful for all feedback received
from the editors of the journal and on all previous drafts of this publication.
1. PETER ANDREAS, POLICING THE GLOBE: CRIMINALIZATION AND CRIME CONTROL IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 14 (2006).
2. A review of available scholarly articles registered on Academic Search Premier from
1899 to 2017 produced a list of 94 articles, 79 of which were generated since the year 2000.
The vast majority of these articles are found in law journals, and focus primarily on legal
procedure, due process, and human rights issues.
3. Some exceptions include, for example, George Ginsburgs, Extradition Issues in
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With this in mind, this article focuses on the use of extradition as a
foreign policy tool, and considers when and how extradition serves as
a mechanism for cooperation in international relations.
Examining its use in the U.S.-Mexico context, specifically, this
article helps to illustrate some of the legal, procedural, and policy
considerations involved in the use of extradition. The U.S.-Mexico
case is an interesting one because of the long-standing existence of a
bilateral extradition treaty and the dramatic increase in the use of
extradition between the two countries in recent years.4
While there was a flurry of research on extradition in the U.S.Mexico context in the late 1980s and 1990s, there have been
surprisingly few scholarly books or articles in the last decade or so.5
Therefore, our work addresses an important lacuna in the literature that
seeks to understand how and when the two countries use extradition is
used as a foreign policy tool. The subsequent discussion provides a
primarily descriptive overview of the use of extradition in the U.S.Mexico context. It is comprised of three sections: the first briefly
explains the history of extradition, the general structure of extradition
treaties, and the bureaucratic steps in the extradition process.6 The next
section highlights some peculiarities of the extradition treaty and
dynamics between the United States and Mexico.7 The final section
provides a systematic examination of the trends in extradition between
the two countries.8 Throughout, the authors rely upon the existing
literature, official government data, and author interviews with U.S.
and Mexican diplomatic and law enforcement officials.
II. STRUCTURING COOPERATION: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION LAW
In order to understand the use of international extradition as a law
enforcement tool, it is first necessary to review the relevant legal norms
Russian-Turkmen Relations, 29 REV. OF CENT. & E. EUR. L. 437, 437–456 (2004);
CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE, EXTRADITION, POLITICS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2001).
4. EMILY EDMONDS-POLI & DAVID SHIRK, CONTEMPORARY MEXICAN POLITICS (2d. ed.
2016).
5. A few exceptions include DANIEL S. MARGOLIES, SPACES OF LAW IN AMERICAN
FOREIGN RELATIONS: EXTRADITION AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE BORDERLANDS AND
BEYOND, 1877–1898 (2011); Sara Pérez Kasparian, México y la Extradición Internacional, 3
AMARIO MEXICANO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 807 (2008). However, these examples predate the dramatic surge in U.S.-Mexico extraditions that we document in this paper.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part V.
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and procedures. In this section, we provide a brief background on the
practice of extradition, and examine how extradition treaties are
structured.
A. International Extradition Treaties
Extradition was used in ancient Egypt and evolved over time into
a widely-accepted principle of international law.9 In the mid-1700s,
countries began to codify extradition practices in bilateral treaties
designed to establish the terms and conditions under which one
country’s authorities would surrender an individual within their
territory or possession to the authorities of another country.10
According to Blakesley (1981), the term “extradition” was first used
officially in France’s décret-loi in 1791, and the term began to be used
in international treaties in the late 1820s.11 A content analysis of books
dating back to 1800 shows that use of the term “extradition” in books
surged to its highest point during the late 19th century, and has
experienced ebbs and flows since the turn of the 20th century.12
Historically, the use of extradition in treaties has been primarily
bilateral and rested heavily on the principal of reciprocity.13 That is,
most extradition treaties have been established to ensure mutual
rendition of fugitives, and did not rely on mediation or enforcement
mechanisms—such as international tribunals—to address grievances.14
Instead, countries are expected to abide by a treaty’s established terms
because failing to do so could undermine the prospect of future
extraditions or cooperation in other areas of the international
relationship.15
Thus, the stakes involved in such an agreement are considerable,
and there are major implications for all parties involved. In signing a
treaty, a sending country agrees to relinquish its jurisdiction—at least
temporarily—over the individual that is subject to extradition.16 In so
9. Christopher L. Blakesley, The Practice of Extradition from Antiquity to Modern
France and the United States: A Brief History, 4 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 39, 41–42 (1981).
10. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL98958,
EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES: OVERVIEW OF THE LAW AND RECENT
TREATIES (2010).
11. Blakesley, supra note 9.
12. Includes references in a sample of millions of publications digitized by Google Books
from 1800 to 2008, the most recent year available, based on an online search conducted on
October 1, 2017. Ngram Viewer, GOOGLE BOOKS, https://books.google.com/ngrams.
13. Blakesley, supra note 9, at 44.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. GARCIA & DOYLE, supra note 10.
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doing, the Sending country effectively agrees to surrender its unique
coercive powers of the Receiving country.17 Meanwhile, for the
Receiving country, the treaty establishes the terms and conditions
under which extradition may be granted and the expectations of how
the individual in question shall be treated.18
International extradition treaties generally share a set of
provisions that outline extraditable crimes, non-extraditable offenses,
jurisdictional limits, rules for extraditing nationals, and procedural
limitations.19 We will briefly discuss each of these in turn before
examining the specific procedures used by the United States and
Mexico for requesting or responding to extradition requests.
In most cases, extradition is limited to offenses specifically listed
in an international treaty. Until the late twentieth century, these crimes
were specifically listed by name (e.g., murder, aggravated assault,
rape, kidnapping, larceny, embezzlement, bribery, fraud, etc.).20
However, it is now common for treaties simply to state that all felonies
are extraditable unless specifically excluded elsewhere in the treaty.21
All extraditable offenses must meet the standard of dual criminality. 22
That is, both sides must each recognize the offense as a crime, and
demonstrate it as such by referring to specific local or national criminal
statutes in the extradition documents submitted to their counterpart.23
It is also common for extradition treaties to specifically outline nonextraditable crimes.24
Historically, the types of crimes listed in international extradition
treaties have excluded military and political offenses.25 However, in
recent times, countries like the United States have begun to distinguish
between prosecutions that are motivated by discriminatory or political
interests from those designed to punish criminal acts such as terrorism
and other violent crimes, which may be political in nature, but are
specified in treaties to be extraditable offenses.26 Furthermore, a
number of countries deny extradition when the suspect faces capital
17. Ann Powers, Justice Denied? The Adjudication of Extradition Applications, 37 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 277, 284 (2002).
18. GARCIA & DOYLE, supra note 10.
19. Powers, supra note 17.
20. Id.
21. GARCIA & DOYLE, supra note 10.
22. Id. at 9–10.
23. Id. at 9.
24. Id. at 5.
25. Id. at 7.
26. Id. at 7–8.
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punishment and/or life imprisonment.27 In some of these cases the
treaties specify that extradition will be refused unless the Sending
country receives assurance that the suspect will not be executed and
that the maximum sentence sought will not approximate a life term.28
It is generally the case that countries seek the transfer of suspects
that are thought to be guilty of committing crimes in their territory.
However, some countries’ constitutions allow them to prosecute
crimes by their nationals committed anywhere in the world. 29
Therefore, provisions defining territorial and extraterritorial
prosecution are an important element of most extradition treaties.30
Similarly, countries often disagree over whether it is appropriate to
extradite their own nationals, so many treaties also contain a statement
that clarifies whether countries can be bound to surrender their own
citizens.31
Procedural limitations such as a prohibition on double jeopardy
and respect for statutes of limitations are other common features of
extradition treaties, yet here again there is not always perfect
agreement, since some countries allow extradition for prosecution of
the “same acts” but not the “same offenses.”32 Furthermore, some
treaties privilege time limit provisions in the Requesting state, others
privilege time limits in the Sending state, while still others make it
clear that no country’s statute of limitations can prevent extradition.33
International extradition treaties also commonly contain clauses
that determine the distribution of expenses associated with
representation, translation of documents and proceedings, and the
suspect’s transportation.34 Furthermore, they outline rules regarding
transfer of evidence, as well as the required procedural steps in a

27. Mexico is one such country. Ley de Extradición Internacional [LEI], Diario Oficial
de la Federacion [DOF] 29-12-1975.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. The rise of terrorism and drug trafficking has increased interest in this area, in cases
where two countries have different laws regulating extraterritorial jurisdiction, cooperation
tends to be difficult and infrequent.
31. This is the case in Mexico. Ley de Extradición Internacional [LEI], supra note 27.
32. Yvonne M. Dutton, U.S.–Mexico Extradition and Cross-Border Prosecution, TRANSBORDER INSTITUTE, U. OF SAN DIEGO (Dec. 1, 2004).
33. GARCIA & DOYLE, supra note 10, at 15–16.
34. Interview with a representative of the California Prosecutor’s Office [hereinafter
CPO]. Interviews cited in this article were conducted under the premise of confidentiality. Out
of respect for those interviewed, their names, and the dates of the interviews, will not be
disclosed.
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formal extradition request.35
B. The Extradition Process
In order to carry out an extradition, countries typically follow a
set of strict procedures that is outlined in accordance with domestic
law and, where applicable, international treaties.36 In practical terms,
this means that the process generally unfolds through a well-defined
set of steps in which the Requesting country formally requests the
extradition of a fugitive or wanted individual from the Sending country
in which they currently reside.37 As an example, the U.S. procedure for
requesting extradition from a foreign country is outlined below.
First, in order to begin the process of extradition, U.S. federal or
state-level prosecutors meet with the corresponding law enforcement
agency to learn about the nature of a crime and determine whether it is
an extraditable offense.38 Because of the extended time and
considerable resources required for extradition, prosecutors tend to
pursue only those cases that are likely to end with a significant
sentence.39
Once a prosecutor decides to pursue a case, their agency prepares
a “package,” which has two main components.40 First is the
prosecutor’s affidavit, which explains the domestic laws broken
(including punishment and any relevant statutes of limitations) and
verifies that the offense is extraditable under the bilateral treaty.41 The
second is an investigator’s affidavit, which explains the facts of the
case and demonstrates that there is sufficient evidence (including
copies of arrest warrants, photographs, other documentation and
physical evidence) linking the suspect to the crime, and information on
the probable location (jurisdiction) of the suspect.42
This package is sent to the Office of International Affairs
(“OIA”), the office within the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”),

35. Id.
36. Id. See also Powers, supra note 17, at 284–85.
37. Interview with CPO representative, supra note 34. See also Powers, supra note 17,
at 284–85.
38. Interview with CPO representative, supra note 34.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. In cases (such as Mexico) where countries refuse to extradite suspects facing capital
punishment, the package must also include the prosecutor’s assurance that a guilty sentence
will not be punished by death. Id.
42. Id.
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which reviews all extradition requests.43 Once OIA approves the
petition, it is sent to the U.S. State Department (“DOS”) for its review
and approval.44 Cases approved by DOS are forwarded to the U.S.
Embassy in the relevant country, where lawyers convert the package
into a Diplomatic Note to be sent to the Sending country’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.45
National rules governing how the sending nation handles
extradition requests varies, however they tend to follow a standard
sequence in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reviews and
evaluates the extradition request to ensure that it complies and meets
the requirements set forth by its bilateral treaty with the United States.46
If it does, the petition is turned over to that country’s Attorney General
who presents it to a federal/national judge, who then issues a detention
order for the suspect for the purpose of extradition.47
The Attorney General’s office then works with law enforcement
to execute the warrant and apprehend the suspect.48 Once the suspect
is in custody, s/he must be presented with the extradition order.49
Again, each country’s laws governing the legal options available to
suspects will vary, but in most Western countries, suspects have an
opportunity to appeal or make a case for why they should not be
extradited.50
Once the appeal process has been exhausted, either the U.S.
prosecutor’s office or the OIA arranges with foreign law enforcement
agency for the transfer of the suspect to the United States where s/he
will stand trial only for the offenses included in the extradition
package.51
Clearly, the extradition process is both complex and cumbersome.
It should come as no surprise that an average extradition generally
takes six months, and more likely up to a year to complete. 52 As a
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. This is the rule of specialty: U.S. prosecutors cannot add new charges against a
suspect even if incriminating evidence is discovered later. This means that if the extradition
process begins too early, a suspect may face only a limited number of charges and therefore
serve a shorter sentence than s/he otherwise might have. Id.
52. Id.
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result, the two countries have historically looked for alternative ways
to exchange suspects more expeditiously.53
III. EXTRADITION IN THE U.S.-MEXICO CONTEXT
An examination of how extradition is used in the U.S.-Mexico
context is useful both because of the special relationship that these two
countries share and because of the growing use of extradition between
them since the signing of the current U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty
in 1978. Below we provide a brief discussion of the historical
relationship between the United States and Mexico and the
implications for international cooperation through extradition. Next,
we delve into the particulars of the current U.S.-Mexico extradition
treaty and recent cooperation on law enforcement and security issues.
A. Cooperation and Sensitivities in the U.S.-Mexico Relationship
The United States and Mexico share a nearly 2000-mile territorial
border.54 It is the world’s longest border between a developed and
developing country.55 There is significant economic disparity between
the two countries, with the average U.S. household earning almost four
times that of the average Mexican household.56 Despite their economic
asymmetries, the two countries are intimately linked together by active
cross-border commerce and demographic ties that stretch well beyond
the shared border.57 In recent decades, U.S. and Mexican authorities
have worked together to build a strong relationship, forging
agreements at all levels of government to promote cooperation on
trade, natural resource management, environmental protection, and
law enforcement.58
53. A detailed discussion of the alternatives falls beyond the scope of this paper, however
it is worth mentioning that diplomatic and law enforcement agencies on both sides have often
worked together to exchange suspects using deportation and, more controversially,
surreptitious surrender of suspects at a port of entry. Less frequent, but even more
controversial is the use of extraterritorial abductions to obtain wanted suspects. This issue is
discussed in greater detail later in this paper. Dea Abramschmitt, Neighboring Countries; UnNeighborly Acts: A Look at the Extradition Relationships Among the United States, Mexico,
and Canada, 4 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 121 (1995).
54. JANICE CHERYL BEAVER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21729, U.S. INTERNATIONAL
BORDERS: BRIEF FACTS (2006).
55. PAUL GANSTER, THE U.S.-MEXICAN BORDER TODAY: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (3d ed. 2016).
56. JOAN B. ANDERSON & JAMES GERBER, FIFTY YEARS OF CHANGE ON THE U.S.-MEXICO
BORDER: GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT, AND QUALITY OF LIFE (2008).
57. CHRISTOPHER E. WILSON, WORKING TOGETHER: ECONOMIC TIES BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND MEXICO (2011).
58. ANDREW SELEE & PETER SMITH, MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES: THE POLITICS OF
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Still, it is an understatement to say that the U.S.-Mexico
relationship has not always been a cooperative one and, to this day,
there remain a number of tensions, challenges, and sensitivities that
complicate the relationship. Many of these date back to the time that
Mexico came into existence in 1821, after a hard fought, decade-long
war for independence.59 While the United States initially recognized
Mexico and the original boundaries negotiated with Spain under the
Adams-Onís Treaty, the two countries went to war in 1846, over
territorial disputes related to the U.S. annexation of Texas.60
By the end of hostilities in 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
redrew the U.S.-Mexico land border, granting the United States a vast
swath of Mexican territory as reparations.61 Thereafter, multiple
generations of Mexicans harbored resentments against the United
States and remained on guard against further U.S. expansionism and
intervention in Mexico’s affairs.62 With the U.S. ascendance to great
power status, Mexico remained acutely aware and suspicious of the
power asymmetry between the two countries.63
Thus, for Mexico, cooperation on law enforcement and security
matters has long been a sensitive topic. The prospect of U.S. police,
soldiers, or intelligence officers operating on Mexican soil is
something for which many Mexicans have little tolerance.64
Extradition, which compels a citizen of one country to face justice in
another, is clearly an especially delicate issue. As a result, Mexico has
been historically reluctant to extradite its citizens to the United States,
particularly in the face of several perceived trespasses on Mexican
sovereignty by U.S. law enforcement in the pursuit of suspects.65
Nonetheless, between two countries with substantial cultural ties
and cross-border flows of people and goods (both legal and illicit),
there is a real practical need to address the problem of international
fugitives and cross-border crimes. Some of these challenges can be
addressed through various forms of cooperation between law
enforcement agencies, such as intelligence and evidence sharing,
PARTNERSHIP (2013).
59. PETER SMITH, TALONS OF THE EAGLE: LATIN AMERICA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE
WORLD (4th ed. 2012).
60. Id.
61. Facing devastating war debt, Mexico subsequently agreed to sell what is now much
of southern Arizona and New Mexico in the Gadsden Purchase of 1854. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. JEFFREY DAVIDOW, THE U.S. AND MEXICO: THE BEAR AND THE PORCUPINE (2004).
65. Dutton, supra note 32; DAVIDOW, supra note 64.
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international legal assistance, and even cross-border prosecutions.
However, in recent years, both countries have increasingly relied on
extradition as a tool to aid law enforcement, albeit with different
objectives and priorities.66
B. U.S.-Mexico Treaty and Cooperation on Extradition
The first extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico
was signed in 1861 and identified twelve extraditable crimes.67 Like
many such treaties, the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty has been
amended and updated over time to reflect evolving domestic and
foreign policies.68 For example, according to Zagaris and Padierna
(1997), the original 1861 treaty came about after years of tension over
the issue of fugitive slaves crossing into Mexico.69 The treaty, signed
in the midst of the U.S. civil war and the year before Lincoln’s
Gettysburg address, prohibited the return of fugitive slaves.70
The 1861 treaty also established that neither country was bound
to extradite its own citizens, a provision the courts generally
interpreted to be a prohibition on the extradition of nationals.71 By the
late 19th century, the practice of exempting nationals became an
obstacle to cooperation in the face of frequent cattle rustling,
smuggling, and criminal raids over the U.S.-Mexico border.72 The lack
of an effective legal solution led law enforcement from both sides to
pursue suspects across the border without government consent. 73 The
resulting tensions led to an amended treaty in 1899, which maintained
that neither country was bound to give up its own citizens, but specified
that the executive had the power to do so at its own discretion.74
For its part, Mexico has signed over thirty bilateral extradition
66. EDMONDS-POLI & SHIRK, supra note 4.
67. The United States has extradition treaties with approximately 114 countries, while
Mexico has approximately 35, plus over one hundred conventions that seek to normalize the
practice. For a brief but informative discussion of the development of extradition policy in the
United States, see Aimee Lee, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: The Deleterious
Ramifications of Illegal Abductions, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 126, 132–34 (1993). See also
Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Abductions: America’s “Catch and Snatch” Policy
Run Amok, 31 VA. J. INT’L L. 151, 154–55 (1990–91).
68. The 1861 treaty was amended in 1899, 1902, 1925, and 1939.
69. Bruce Zagaris & Julia Padierna Peratta, Mexico-United States Extradition and
Alternatives: From Fugitive Slaves to Drug Traffickers—150 Years and Beyond the Rio
Grande’s Winding Courses, 12 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 519, 519–627 (1997).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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treaties.75 Mexico is also a signatory to over a hundred conventions that
may have bearing on extradition.76 The United States is not a signatory
to some of these conventions (such as the 2000 Rome Statute for the
International Criminal Court, which was ratified by Mexico in 2005).77
For countries with which Mexico does not have an explicit treaty,
domestic law allows for extradition through comity.78
Article 15 of the Mexican Constitution outlines the framework for
the extradition of an individual, but expressly forbids the use of
extradition against persons wanted for political crimes, enslaved
individuals, and for other individuals whose rights under the Mexican
constitution would be undermined by extradition.79 The 1975
International Extradition Law (Ley de Extradición Internacional)
provides the current regulatory framework and procedure guidelines
for extraditions.80 As a general practice, extraditions requested by the
government of Mexico are referred to as “active extraditions”
(extradiciones activas), while extraditions requested by other nations
are referred to as “passive extraditions” (extradiciones pasivas).81
The current U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty was signed in May
1978 and went into effect in January 1980.82 It consists of twenty-three
articles that specify the conditions that must apply for a suspect to be
extradited from one country to the other.83 For example, Article 2 lists
the 4 extraditable offenses, Article 3 establishes the required evidence,
Article 6 prevents double jeopardy, and Article 7 prohibits prosecution

75. In addition to the United States, Mexico has bilateral treaties with Australia, Belize,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Ecuador, France,
Greece, Guatemala, India, Italy, South Korea, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Portugal, Spain,
United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Interview with a former Mexican Government
official, see supra note 34. Gabriel Mario Santos Villarreal, Instrumentos Internacionales
firmados por México en materia de Extradición, 66 CONGRESO DE LA UNIÓN 1 (2009).
76. Others conventions include 1933 Inter-American Convention on Extradition (ratified
by Mexico in 1936); the 1948 Convention to Prevent and Sanction the Crime of Genocide; the
1996 Inter-American Convention on Corruption (ratified by Mexico in 1997); the 2003 United
Nations Convention on Corruption (ratified by Mexico in 2004). Id.
77. Michael P. Scharf, The Politics Behind U.S. Opposition to the International Criminal
Court, 6 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 97 (1999).
78. Ley de Extradición Internacional [LEI], supra note 27.
79. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CPEUM, Diario Oficial de
la Federación [DOF] 05-02-1917.
80. Ley de Extradición Internacional [LEI], supra note 27.
81. Interview with a former Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations personnel, see supra
note 34.
82. See Extradition Treaty Between the United Stated of America and The United
Mexican States, Mex.-U.S., May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059.
83. Id. Article 15 (on delayed and temporary surrender) was amended in 1997.
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of cases where the statute of limitations has run out in either country.84
Following previous iterations, the 1978 treaty specifies the
circumstances under which countries can refuse to extradite a
suspect.85 For example, Article 5 prohibits extradition of those accused
of political or military crimes, Article 8 states that extradition may be
refused for suspects facing capital punishment unless there are
assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed, and Article 9
establishes that neither country is bound to surrender its own citizens,
but that the executive branch of each country may decide to do so at
its own discretion.86
In practice, Articles 8 and 9 have created the most serious
obstacles to cooperation on extradition cases.87 As mentioned earlier,
Mexico refused to surrender Mexican nationals to the United States
until fairly recently.88 Disagreement over this issue led to tit-for-tat
refusals through most of the twentieth century and in some cases had
a detrimental effect on the broader bilateral relationship.89 Mexico’s
justification in many cases was that it had the ability to seek justice
using the domestic judicial process.90 However, actors in the United
States frequently found such efforts slow and unsatisfactory, which led
them to pursue alternatives such as irregular rendition of suspects. 91
Predictably, such actions were perceived as the U.S. using its power
differential to violate Mexican sovereignty and had controversial
consequences.92
Another obstacle to cooperation was Mexico’s refusal to extradite
suspects (regardless of nationality) who faced the death penalty.93
Mexico outlawed capital punishment in 1975 and therefore insisted
that any international extradition respect this law.94 The United States
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Dutton, supra note 32.
88. Id.
89. DAVIDOW, supra note 64.
90. Kasparian, supra note 5.
91. Michael R. Wing, Extradition Treaties – International Law – The United States
Supreme Court Approves Extraterritorial Abduction of Foreign Criminals – United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992), 23 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 435 (1993).
92. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). The most notorious case was
Alvarez-Machain, which is discussed infra.
93. Dutton, supra note 32.
94. Capital punishment was deemed unconstitutional in 1930, but it was not entirely
eliminated from state penal codes until 1975. That said, capital punishment can still be applied
in Mexican military courts for the crimes of insubordination and treason. Id.
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objected to this article of the treaty and put pressure on Mexico to grant
exceptions so that it would be possible to prosecute drug traffickers
and others suspected of perpetrating serious crimes.95
These efforts were clearly undermined in the 1980s by the
Camarena affair.96 In 1985, a U.S. DEA Agent named Enrique (Kiki)
Camarena was conducting an undercover narco-trafficking
investigation in Mexico, when a corrupt Mexican official is believed
to have blown his cover.97 Subsequently, Camarena and his Mexican
pilot were abducted, tortured, and murdered, allegedly with the
knowledge and possible collusion of corrupt Mexican officials.98 The
U.S. government, and especially law enforcement agencies, were
outraged and frustrated by their perception that Mexican authorities
may have been involved and were doing little to investigate
Camarena’s murder.99
Years later, under evident direction from DEA officials, U.S.
bounty hunters abducted a Mexican doctor named Humberto Álvarez
Machaín, who was accused of collaborating in Camarena’s torture and
murder.100 This irregular rendition was eventually challenged before
the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of United States v. AlvarezMachain, but its legality was ultimately upheld.101 Not surprisingly, the
Mexican government was outraged by this breach of Mexican
sovereignty.102 At few times in the 20th century were the frictions
between the two countries greater than at this time.103
Ultimately, though, the two countries made significant progress
on bilateral cooperation on extradition. While the two countries
exchanged just thirty-eight suspects between 1980 and 1994 (eight
from Mexico to the U.S., and 30 from the U.S. to Mexico), this number
rose to a total of 147 extraditions between 1995 and 2000.104 Moreover,
during that period, Mexico broke with the past by sending seven of its
95. Interview with a former official in U.S. Attorney’s Office, see supra note 34.
96. DAVIDOW, supra note 64.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Abramschmitt, supra note 53.
101. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.; Abramschmitt, supra note 53.
102. Bradley Thrush, United States’ Sanctioned Kidnappings Abroad: Can the United
States Restore International Confidence in Its Extradition Treaties, 11 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 181 (1994).
103. Abramovsky, supra note 67. See also Lee, supra note 67; Abramschmitt, supra note
53.
104. Dutton, supra note 32.
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nationals to face justice in the United States, a dramatic change that
prompted domestic opposition and constitutional challenges to the
international treaty.105 Bolstering executive authority, in January 2001,
the Mexican Supreme Court affirmed the executive branch’s discretion
to extradite Mexican nationals for foreign prosecution.106 Since that
time, Article 9 has not posed a major obstacle to bilateral cooperation,
as our findings demonstrate below.107
To be sure, extradition efforts were temporarily set back when the
Mexican Supreme Court ruled in October 2001 that the U.S.
government could not extradite suspects who faced the possibility of a
life sentence.108 The court reasoned that such a punishment did not
present the possibility of rehabilitation and was inconsistent with
Mexican law, and therefore considered it unconstitutional.109 However,
for U.S. law enforcement this presented a vexing problem because,
mandatory sentencing guidelines often included the possibility of a life
sentence (e.g., thirty years to life).110 Not surprisingly, the Mexican
Supreme Court ruling prompted vocal and coordinated opposition in
the United States, with U.S. law enforcement officials calling for the
Bush administration to take up the issue with their Mexican
counterparts and perhaps even demand a renegotiation of the
extradition treaty.111 The controversy was resolved when the Mexican
Supreme Court reversed itself in 2005, reasoning that some Mexican
states had since adopted the use of compound sentences that were the
equivalent of life sentences.112
Overall, the two governments have worked to ensure that
restrictions in the 1978 treaty has not hindered the success of U.S.Mexico cooperation on extradition. On the U.S. side this has meant
providing assurances (often by amending charges) to the Mexican
government that a suspect will not face life imprisonment or the death
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. At the time, Mexico allowed a maximum prison sentence of 40 years, with the
possibility of a 60-year term in special cases. Tim Weiner, Extraditions are Limited by a
Ruling
in
Mexico,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
20,
2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/20/world/extraditions-are-limited-by-a-ruling-inmexico.html.
109. Dutton, supra note 32.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Hugh Dellios, Mexico’s High Court Decision Opens an Extradition Pipeline,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Dec. 18, 2005), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-1218/news/0512180245_1_extradition-requests-extradition-case-mexican-officials.
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penalty. On the Mexican side this has meant providing assurances to
the U.S. government that the executive, rather than the judiciary, has
the authority and ability to determine whether the type or length of a
particular sentence qualifies as life imprisonment.113 As we will discuss
in greater detail below, the willingness of the two countries to work
together to strengthen cooperation on extradition appears to reflect
improvements in the overall quality of the bilateral relationship.
IV. EXTRADITION TRENDS AND ANALYSIS
Of the hundreds of extraditions to the United States in any given
year, a significant percentage comes from Mexico.114 Indeed, according
to data from the U.S. Marshals Service and the Department of Justice,
on average about 1-in-10 extraditions handled by their agency over the
last decade have been from Mexico.115 Thus, Mexico provides a useful
case study for understanding how extradition works, when and why it
is used (or not), and its overall utility as a tool for international
cooperation in law enforcement. In this section, we first briefly look at
general extradition trends between the United States and the rest of the
world before turning to a closer examination of the overall trends in
U.S.-Mexico extraditions, and the factors that appear to influence
them.
A. Recent Data and Analysis on International Extraditions to the
United States
It is worth noting that data on international extraditions is not as
readily available as one might expect for at least two reasons. First,
detailed information on many extraditions is generally not disclosed
publicly because there are sensitive law enforcement issues involved.
For example, some individuals subject to extradition may be under
consideration as cooperating witnesses in ongoing criminal
investigations.116 Second, extraditions are handled by multiple
agencies that have different patterns of reporting, which may also
relate to law enforcement sensitivities.117 For example, if a particular
U.S. agency is working covertly with a foreign government’s
permission, it may not wish to publicize extraditions that it handles in
said country, either for law enforcement or due to mutually recognized
113. In practice this has taken the form of accepting the argument that any suspect eligible
for parole is not, strictly speaking, serving a life sentence. See Dutton, supra note 32.
114. U.S. Marshal’s data demonstrate this, see infra Figure 1.
115. Id.
116. Interview with CPO representative, supra note 34.
117. Id.
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political concerns.
With these limitations in mind, the authors reviewed detailed
agency level data from the U.S. Marshals Service, the agency that
handles the vast majority of international extraditions to the United
States.118 As a general trend, the available data show that for the period
between 2003 and 2016, the use of extradition to United States was
robust (see

FIGURE 1) and clearly represented a marked increase from the past
(see Figure 2).119 It is also worth noting that within this same period,
there was a sizeable increase. For example, while there were nearly
400 extraditions in 2004, the number rose by well over 25% in
subsequent years, peaking at roughly 600 annually in 2008 and 2009.
The number of international extraditions to the United States remained
at around 500 or more until 2014, when it dropped to less than 400
extraditions again in 2015 and 2016.
The general patterns found in these data raise questions about the
factors that cause the number of extraditions to rise and fall. For
example, to what extent are the trends a function of actual criminal
violence, trans-nationalism, bureaucratic capability, political will, or
other factors such as economic ties or power asymmetries?120 On the
one hand, some point to growing threats from transnational actors and
groups as a motivation for increased use of extradition, as well as the
growing propensity of the United States to expand the

118. Data from U.S. Marshals Service included detailed information from 2003 to 2016
on the Sending nation, requesting jurisdiction, citizenship of the individual extradited, and the
charge for which they were being extradited. Data for 2000–2002 were not available.
119. While we lack comprehensive data on the number of extraditions to the United States
before 2003, evidence from Mexico, infra Figure 2, may serve as a proxy for a broader trend
that shows increased use of extradition beginning in the early 2000s.
120. Note that the war on terror and the war on drugs have increased the propensity of the
United States to seek extradition and otherwise expand the extraterritoriality of U.S. laws.
GARCIA & DOYLE, supra note 10.
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extraterritoriality of its laws in this context.121

FIGURE 1: INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITIONS
STATES
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On the other hand, the data in Figure 1 suggest that the use of
extradition may reflect partisan preferences or the strategy of a specific
administration: the Bush administration appears to have been more
willing to or more successful at using extradition as a policy tool than
the Obama administration, which may reflect to different strategies in
counter-terrorism efforts.123 Although addressing these broader
questions falls outside the scope of this paper, the findings from the
U.S.-Mexico case help us gain some further insight on the dynamics
of extradition, and thereby bring us a step closer to explaining more
121. See PYLE, supra note 3.
122. Source: U.S. Marshals Service.
123. Given that extradition is a lengthy process, it is worth noting that most of the
extraditions that took place in 2008 and 2009 were likely initiated by the second Bush
administration (2004–2008).
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general variations in the use of extradition as a foreign policy tool.
B. Data on Mexican Extraditions to the United States
In addition to the case-level U.S. Marshals Service data, the
authors also referenced data compiled by the Congressional Research
Service (“CRS”), which include extraditions from Mexico to the
United States handled by other federal agencies (e.g., FBI or DEA),
and therefore presumably provide a more complete picture of the
aggregated number of extraditions each year. The authors also
reviewed documents from the Centro de Documentación, Información
y Análisis, a research arm of the Mexican Congress. According to
these various sources, the number of extraditions from Mexico to the
United States grew from just eight between 1980–1994, to sixty-one
between 1995–2000, 148 between 2001–2005, 443 between 2006–
2010, and 397 between 2011–15.124 The dramatic increase in annual
apprehensions in the 2006–2010 period is especially noticeable in
Figure 2.
FIGURE 2: TOTAL ANNUAL EXTRADITIONS
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124. Note that the authors were unable to obtain annualized data referencing the period
before 1995. These data are reported at somewhat uneven intervals because they come from
sources using different time periods. See infra Figure 2.
125. Adapted from Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin Finklea, “U.S.-Mexican Security
Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond,” Congressional Research Service, Report
Number R41349, June 29, 2017, p. 26.
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Case-level data from the U.S.-Marshalls service shown in Figure
3 illustrates that the decade-long surge in the number of extraditions
from Mexico to the United States between 2003 and 2016 brought
variation in the type of cases for which extradition was employed. All
told, drug-related crimes were the primary offense in the largest share
of cases handled during this period, as can be seen clearly in Figure 4.
However, it is also noticeable that over the years there has been a
growing number of cases involving other types of offenses, including
homicide, sex crimes involving a minor, and other types of sex crimes.
Indeed, during the height of U.S.-Mexico counter-drug efforts
under President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012), the U.S. Marshalls
Service handled extraditions for 108 individuals wanted on homicide
charges, fifty-five wanted for sex crimes involving a minor, twentytwo wanted for other sexual offenses, and forty-seven wanted for
various other crimes (such as alien smuggling, weapons violations, and
assault). Hence, an important finding of this research is that the
impetus to cooperate on extradition in drug-related cases likely opened
the door for bilateral cooperation on other types of cases.
FIGURE 3: EXTRADITIONS FROM MEXICO TO UNITED STATES, BY
CHARGE, 2003–2016126
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Figure 4 further illustrates these trends: Nearly half (45%) of
Mexican extraditions to the United States from 2003 to 2016 were
cases involving drug charges, while roughly a quarter (27%) were
cases involving homicide charges. As we will see below, this is a
126. Source: U.S. Marshalls Service.
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different pattern that that exhibited in extraditions from the United
States to Mexico. There are differences in the number and type of
extradition cases in which Mexico extradited fugitives from the United
States. Also, it should be noted that, according to the Marshalls Service
data, a large majority (76%) of individuals that Mexico extradited to
the United States during this period were Mexican nationals, while
roughly one in six (17%) were U.S. citizens and the remainder came
from various other countries. Hence, a key finding here is that in the
2000s Mexico was clearly more willing than in the past to send its own
citizens to the United States to face justice.
FIGURE 4: TOTAL EXTRADITIONS
STATES, BY CHARGE, 2003–2016127
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C. Data on U.S. Extraditions to Mexico
Based on available data from the U.S. Marshalls Service, there
were 254 suspects extradited from the United States to Mexico between
2003 and 2016. While these numbers represent a significant increase
127. Source: U.S. Marshalls Service
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over past practices, it was not as dramatic as that seen in the other
direction: Rather than a continuous upward trend, we see more
fluctuations in the yearly number of suspects sent to Mexico, and rather
than dramatic increases in the hundreds, we see yearly variations in the
number of suspects extradited is in the tens. Still, it is worth noting that
overall, the United States was more willing to extradite suspects to
Mexico. However, as was also the case with northbound extraditions,
there was also a dramatic decline in the number of extraditions from the
United States to Mexico in the last two years available, as the number
of cases dropped from twenty-seven in 2014 to just seven in 2015.
FIGURE 5: EXTRADITIONS
2003–2016128
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128. Source: U.S. Marshalls Service
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FIGURE 6: EXTRADITIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO MEXICO,
BY OFFENSE, 2003–2016129
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As Figure 6 illustrates, over three quarters (76%) of U.S.
extraditions to Mexico from 2003 to 2016 were cases involving
homicide, while the next largest set of cases involved fraud (11%),
drug offenses (10%), and kidnapping (7%). In this sense it seems clear
that, when it comes to extradition, there is a clear difference in the
priorities of Mexican law enforcement compared to their U.S.
counterparts. These differences and the possible explanations are
explored in greater detail below.
D. Analyzing Trends in U.S.-Mexico Extraditions
As we have discussed, U.S.-Mexican relations have long been
characterized by tension and mistrust, even amid their growing
economic integration and frequent collaboration. The asymmetry of
the relationship is often a factor that contributes to this dynamic, as it
129. Source: U.S. Marshalls Service
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contributes to an overbearing U.S. attitude toward Mexico, and
Mexico’s frustration and reluctance to capitulate to the United States.
A glance at the data shows clear asymmetries and differences,
particularly in the number and type of cases for which the United States
and Mexico have employed extradition in recent years. While this was
not the case in earlier decades starting in the mid-1990s, there were far
more extraditions from Mexico to the United States than vice versa.130
By the 2000s, Mexico was typically sending more than three times as
many fugitives as the United States in any given year, and most of
these were Mexican nationals.131
The priorities of the two countries also appear to be very different.
Whereas the large majority of U.S. extraditions to Mexico involve
homicide charges, these represent only a small minority share of
Mexican extraditions to the United States. Among Mexico’s
extraditions to the United States, nearly one in six cases involves
sexual crimes (including those involving minors), while such cases
represent a fairly insignificant number of U.S. extraditions to Mexico.
These differences clearly suggest that the two countries have different
law enforcement priorities. In addition, the ability of the United States
to seek extradition in a large number and wide range of cases also
partly reflects the resources and capacity to do so. Former Mexican
Secretary of Foreign Relations personnel interviewed confidentially
for this article noted that their U.S. counterparts were able to dedicate
comparatively more staff and funding to extradition requests.132
Yet, more than the differences between them, what is particularly
striking is the extent to which there was a clear increase in the
propensity of both countries to use extradition in the 2000s. This would
not have been possible without a gradual rebuilding of trust between
law enforcement agencies in the two countries after the troubled years
that followed the earlier mentioned murder of DEA agent Enrique
Camarena in Mexico. Building the trust necessary to repair law
enforcement cooperation took several years, and tended to progress in
fits and starts. The first signs of rapprochement occurred in 1996 when
the Zedillo and Clinton administrations created a High-Level Contact
group to coordinate efforts to combat cross-border narco-trafficking,
which helped to establish regular meetings and communications

130. See supra Figure 2, Figure 5.
131. Id.
132. Interview with a former Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations personnel, see supra
note 34.
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between law enforcement officials from both countries.133
However, bilateral ties were damaged a short time later, when
Mexico’s drug czar was revealed to have ties to the Juárez drug
cartel.134 The relationship was dealt an additional blow when it came to
light that U.S. law enforcement agencies had conducted an
unauthorized investigation against the Colombian Cali cartel on
Mexican soil between 1995 and 1998.135 Yet despite these setbacks,
U.S. and Mexican officials were able to gradually build working
relationships based on mutual respect and cooperation.136
For example, Mexico demonstrated its good will and desire to
work with the United States to combat drug trafficking in 1997 when
SRE approved the U.S.’s request to detain and extradite Everardo
Arturo “Kitty” Paez, a top lieutenant in the Arellano Félix
Organization, arguably Mexico’s most powerful drug cartel at the
time.137 Mexican authorities arrested Paez in Tijuana, but his
extradition was blocked by legal challenges questioning the
constitutionality of extraditing Mexican nationals.138 The Mexican
Supreme Court’s decision in January 2001 upholding the
constitutionality of extraditing Mexican citizens paved the way for
Paez’s transfer to the United States just four months later.139 Yet
without the preceding shift in diplomatic relations and clear political
will on the part of the Zedillo and Fox administrations, it is unlikely
that extradition would have been seen as the viable foreign policy tool
that it became.
Under President Calderón (2006–2012), U.S.-Mexico security
cooperation reached a high-water mark.140 President Calderón made
133. PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE 71 (1st ed.
2000).
134. General Jesús Gutierrez Rebollo was arrested in 1997 and later sentenced to 40 years
in prison. Tracy Wilkinson, Jose De Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo Dies at 79; Disgraced Mexican
General, L.A. TIMES, (De. 20, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/20/local/la-mejose-gutierrez-rebollo-20131221.
135. DAVIDOW, supra note 64.
136. Importantly, the collaborative approach survived changes in administrations in both
countries, as Presidents Bush and Fox sought to maintain strong bilateral ties. Id.
137. Ken Ellingwood, Drug Trafficker Pleads Guilty, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2001),
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/oct/12/local/me-56308.
138. Id.
139. Paez was the first Mexican citizen to be extradited to the United States to face drug
trafficking charges. He was convicted of cocaine trafficking and criminal association, and
sentenced to 30 years in prison. Later (after the arrest/murder of Benjamin and Ramon
Arellano Félix) he provided information that proved invaluable to the dismantling of the AFO.
Id.
140. EDMONDS-POLI & SHIRK, supra note 4.

EDMONDS-POLI & SHIRK - EXTRADITION AS A TOOL (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

EXTRADITION AS A TOOL FOR COOPERATION

8/11/2018 1:15 PM

239

counter-narcotics efforts and U.S.-Mexico law enforcement
cooperation a top priority during his administration.141 Seeking U.S.
material support for these efforts, Calderón negotiated the three-year
$1.4 billion Mérida Agreement with President George W. Bush, as
both argued that the United States had a shared responsibility to
contribute to Mexico’s counter-drug efforts.142 In part because
Calderón’s efforts relied heavily on the “kingpin” strategy of targeting
top organized crime leaders for arrest in order to disrupt criminal
networks, the use of extradition played a central role in the Calderón
government’s efforts.143 Because of the lack of integrity in Mexican
prisons, extradition provided a means to ensure that key organized
crime leaders would not be able to continue to oversee their criminal
operations from behind bars or even escape from custody.144
The Mérida Initiative continued at a similar rate of annual funding
under President Barack Obama.145 Among other things, the program
bolstered U.S.-Mexican intelligence sharing to dismantle organized
crime groups, Mexican judicial and law enforcement capacity,
southbound inspections to detect illicit bulk cash and arms shipments,
and investments in crime prevention programs.146 Thanks to the Mérida
Initiative, U.S. officials regularly expressed great praise and
admiration for President Calderón, frequently emphasizing his courage
in the fight against organized crime, and one measure of the program’s
success was the steady stream of extradited kingpins sent to the United
States.147
Under Calderón’s successor, President Enrique Peña Nieto
(2012–2018), the total number of extraditions for drug-related offenses
declined sharply from thirty-two in 2013 to sixteen in 2015, while the
number of extraditions in other categories remained fairly constant.
This presents a small puzzle, since it is reasonable to assume that the
number of individuals wanted by the United States for drug offenses
—which included Joaquín “Chapo” Guzmán at that time—would have
141. Id.
142. CLARE RIBANDO-SEELKE & KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL41349,
U.S.-MEXICAN SECURITY COOPERATION: THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE AND BEYOND (2017).
143. Luis Astorga & David A. Shirk, Drugs, Crime, and Violence, in SELEE & SMITH, note
58.
144. Ken Ellingwood, Mexico Drug Suspects Extradited at Record Pace, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 30, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-extradition30-2008nov30-story.html.
145. RIBANDO-SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 142.
146. Eric L. Olson & Christopher E. Wilson, Beyond Merida: The Evolving Approach to
Security Cooperation, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CENTER FOR SCHOLARS (2010),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/beyond_merida.pdf.
147. Ellingwood, Mexico Drug Suspects Extradited at Record Pace, supra note 137.
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remained high, particularly in light of the numerous drug arrests made
in the preceding years. Our explanation for the decline in extraditions
for drug offenses, based partly on confidential interviews with U.S.
government personnel, is that there was a deliberate policy shift under
the Peña Nieto administration.
On taking office, Peña Nieto initially took a markedly different
stance from Calderón on the drug war.148 In an overt bid to move
Mexico to focus on promoting economic progress, Peña Nieto took
great pains to shift the narrative about Mexico from one focused on
crime and violence to one more focused on Mexico’s economic
achievements and opportunities.149 Peña Nieto also asserted that he
would break from the Calderón administration’s focus on organized
crime, and drug-trafficking specifically, in order to prioritize citizen
security issues that directly affected ordinary Mexicans, notably
homicide, kidnapping, and extortion.150 Peña Nieto also appeared to
take a dim view of the Calderón administration’s close cooperation
with the United States, in part due to U.S. spying on his election
campaign.151 To keep a close eye on such cooperation, Peña Nieto
administration officials that U.S.-Mexico security relations would now
be more centrally managed through the “single window”
(ventanilla única) of Mexico’s interior ministry.152 No doubt these
shifts in policy had a dampening effect on drug-related extraditions in
the initial years of the Peña Nieto administration.
However, the Peña Nieto administration’s openness to U.S.Mexico security cooperation, particularly on drug offenses, appeared
to rebound in 2015 and 2016. This may have been attributable to a
number of developments that appear to have changed the Peña Nieto
administration’s stance on counter-drug cooperation. Notably, after
improvements in 2012 and 2013, Mexico’s security situation appeared
to worsen again in 2014. That year brought widespread domestic and
148. EDMONDS-POLI & SHIRK, supra note 4.
149. Alejandro Hope, Menos Ruido, Misma Furia, NEXOS (July 1, 2013),
http://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=15373.
150. Richard Fausset, Peña Nieto Team Decries Past Drug Cartel Strategy, L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 21, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/21/world/la-fg-mexico-kingpin20121222.
151. Associated Press, Mexican Diplomats Say Obama Promises Investigation into NSA
Spying,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
22,
2013,
4:38
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/22/mexico-president-nsa-spying-email.
152. U.S. officials were previously able to interface directly with their Mexican
counterparts at various Mexican agencies and at both the national and subnational level,
generally without having to obtain explicit approval from Los Pinos. Kimberly Heinle, et al.,
Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2013, JUSTICE IN MEX. PROJECT (Apr.
2004), https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/2014_DVM.pdf.
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international concern about the emergence of new paramilitary style
organizations in the state of Michoacán, the military’s extrajudicial
killing of nearly two dozen suspects detained in the state of Mexico,
and the murder and disappearance of dozens of students and protesters
originating from the town of Ayotzinapa in the state of Guerrero.153
Such incidents put pressure on the Peña Nieto administration to
continue its counter-drug efforts and beef up security. At the same
time, U.S. government officials interviewed for this paper suggest that
continued efforts to build trust and cooperation through the Mérida
Initiative helped to increase the Peña Nieto administration’s openness
to cooperation with the United States.154
The most symbolic indication of the rebound in extraditions for
drug-related offenses was Mexico’s decision to extradite Guzmán to
the United States on January 19, 2017 in order to face charges in New
York.155 This move was a surprise for many, given Guzmán’s high
profile and the swiftness with which his extradition moved forward.
Some observers suggested that Guzmán’s extradition was a salute to
the outgoing U.S. presidential administration on President Barack
Obama’s last day in office.156 Others saw it as a hedge against pending
political changes in Washington, since Mexican officials viewed
incarcerating Guzmán at home as a liability, but also felt less inclined
to extradite Guzmán under a hostile Trump administration.157 Whatever
the reason, Guzmán case was routed for prosecution to New York’s
Eastern District Court in Brooklyn on a 17-count indictment, marking
another milestone in U.S.-Mexico cooperation on extradition.158
V. CONCLUSIONS
As illustrated by the data presented in this paper, until about 1990,
the number of extraditions between the United States and Mexico was
153. EDMONDS-POLI & SHIRK, supra note 4.
154. Interview with a former Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations personnel, see supra
note 34.
155. Brian Bennett & Deborah Bonello, Prosecutors in These Seven Courtrooms Want ‘El
Chapo’, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fgmexico-guzman-extradition-20160112-story.html.
156. Peter Orsi, Timing of Mexico Drug Lord’s Extradition Seen as Political, U.S. NEWS
(Jan. 20, 2017, 12:06 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-01-20/timingof-mexico-drug-lords-extradition-seen-as-political.
157. Id.
158. Joaquín ‘El Chapo’ Guzman Loera Faces Charges in New York for Leading a
Continuing Criminal Enterprise and other Drug-Related Charges, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Jan.
20, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/joaquin-el-chapo-guzman-loera-faces-chargesnew-york-leading-continuing-criminal-enterprise.
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relatively small. This changed after 1995, when the number gradually
increased, reaching unprecedented levels in the 2000s. Since Donald
Trump’s election, however, the tenor and substance of U.S.-Mexican
relations appear to be at a low not seen since the mid-1980s.159 The
tensions between Presidents Trump and Peña, while not as intense as
they were during the first two months of Trump’s administration, have
yet to be fully repaired. Moreover, the two sides appear to be digging
into their positions not to give in to the demands of the other. These
stances do not appear to bode well for future bilateral cooperation on
a number of issues, including extradition. Judging by the rhetoric of
the current administrations, we might expect to see fewer extraditions
during the next two years to four years.
That said, it is also possible that things are not as bad as they
seem. Indeed, there are a number of signs that Mexico and the United
States are continuing to work together closely in the area of law
enforcement cooperation. It may be that the diplomatic foundation
built over the past twenty years by several presidents, and perhaps
more importantly, by the diplomatic core and law enforcement
agencies, is strong enough to withstand, and least in the short term, the
storms raging in the White House and Los Pinos.
There are at least two reasons to believe that Mexico’s
cooperation with the United States is likely to continue. First, given
Peña’s dismal public approval ratings and accusations that he has been
slow to go after government officials accused of criminal activity,
there are domestic political benefits to be gained from publicly going
after corrupt government officials and violent thugs, especially as
Mexico enters the summer electoral season. Second, there may be an
interest in paving the way for cordial and constructive discussions on
the future of NAFTA. In helping the United States achieve its goal of
prosecuting nefarious characters, the Peña administration may be
sending a signal about its desire to maintain cordial and cooperative
relations in other areas—most notably, trade and investment.
What is clear is that extradition is a process made more complex
by the fact that it involves many actors, scarce resources, multiple veto
points, and is sensitive to the national political climate.160 At the same
159. Azam Ahmed, Mexico’s President Cancels Meeting with Trump over Wall, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/world/mexicos-presidentcancels-meeting-with-trump-over-wall.html.
160. Another interesting test of the strength of the bilateral ties, will be whether the United
States chooses to cooperate with the Mexican government on the case of Cesar Duarte, a
fugitive former governor of the state of Chihuahua wanted on corruption charges and said to
have fled to El Paso, Texas. Patrick McDonnell, The Sordid Record of Former Mexican
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time, extradition is a valuable tool that can be used in a variety of ways
by states seeking to advance their foreign policy goals, even in
asymmetrical power situations. While further research is needed to
clarify the depth and nuanced nature of the use of extradition in the
U.S.-Mexico context, evidence presented here suggests that it serves
as an important barometer of the bilateral relationship.

Governors: 3 in Prison, 3 Under Investigation and 4 Wanted by Authorities, L.A. TIMES (Mar.
31,
2017),
http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-governors20170331-story.html.

